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Abstract
We present a method for digital image watermarking
based on the modification of certain subsets of the wavelet
packet decomposition. These subsets are determined both
from a secret key and an image dependent procedure that
chooses a best basis from an energy criterion. The mark
is set by imposing a parity constraint at each level of the
decomposition. We elaborate on the choice of some of the
parameters of the model, showing how they can be tuned
so as to obtain good resistance to attacks. Examples are
displayed to assess the validity of our approach.
1 Introduction
Digital image watermarking has attracted a lot of inter-
est in recent years, due in particular to the development of
Internet and the World Wide Web. The aim is to protect
ownership by including in the image a copyright informa-
tion. This information, or mark, has to be set in such a
way that it is invisible: indeed, it must not alter the viewing
content and, in addition, it should not be easy to remove.
Furthermore, the mark must be resistant to attacks directed
at erasing it. Such attacks are of two kinds, whether one
uses cryptographic or image processing methods. We shall
be concerned in this paper only with the second type of at-
tacks.
A number of methods have been proposed to insert ro-
bust and invisible watermarks. Some operate directly in
pixel space [1], other in a transform domain, such as Fourier
[2] or DCT [3]. We propose here to study a wavelet packet
based watermarking procedure. Working in the wavelet do-
main yields a number of advantages: First, it allows to con-
trol in a precise way the location both in space and scale
of the mark. Second, wavelet coefficients give a structured
way of representing the information: as is well known for
instance from studies in image compression, in most cases,
only a few coefficients are large, indicating where the in-
formation lies in a given image in terms of scale and space.
This is useful both for invisibility and robustness concerns.
Using wavelet packets adds another degree of freedom be-
cause it allows to select frequency independently of scale.
Finally, wavelet based algorithms are fast and allow to re-
construct the image.
Section 2 briefly recalls some basic facts about wavelet
packets decomposition. Section 3 presents our watermark-
ing algorithm. Some details on the choice of various param-
eters are discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 presents
numerical experiments.
2 Recalls on Wavelet Packets
Wavelet packet decomposition (WPD) is a generaliza-
tion of the dyadic wavelet transform (DWT) where the low
pass parts are further analyzed. Figure 1 shows the decom-
position tree of an image: the coefficients of each packet
are obtained by successive filtering and decimation along
lines and columns. As is apparent from figure 1, this rep-
resentation is redundant, and it is possible to extract a ba-
sis by selecting coefficients in an appropriate way. Figure 2
shows three levels of decomposition of an image, along with
one of the bases corresponding to a particular tiling of the
space/frequency domain. Usually, one defines a “best ba-
sis” as a basis that optimizes a certain criterion. A popular
choice is to minimize the entropy of the representation [4].
A word on notation: C
p;i;j
denotes the packet at resolution
p in the frequency region indexed by i; j. Individual val-
ues of the coefficients in this packet are denoted C
p;i;j
(k),
where k codes for the spatial translation.
3 Watermarking based on the parity of cer-
tain subsets associated to a best basis
Our method consists in inserting a mark by modifying
the best basis associated to an image so that it respects some
parity constraints. More precisely, the mark will be a se-
quence of 0-s and 1-s ; we first compute the best basis us-
ing an energy criterion detailed below (the classical entropy
criterion is not fitted to our needs because it is not robust
to compression). We then extract certain subsets from this
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Figure 1. Quaternary wavelet packet decomposition tree,
obtained by successive filtering and decimation along the
lines and the columns. h and g denotes respectively the
high pass and low pass filters of the DWT.
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Figure 2. (a), (b), (c) : first three levels of the
space/frequency decomposition of an image ; (d) : exam-
ple of an extracted basis
basis, using a private information coded in a secret key. The
image is modified so that, at each level p of the decomposi-
tion, the number of packets in the best basis which are se-
lected by the secret key is odd or even according to whether
the pth element in the mark is 0 or 1. This procedure in-
serts in some sense a “virtual” mark, since it is set on the
structure of the best basis. We now make the different steps
precise (see figure 3).
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Figure 3. Different steps in the watermarking process.
 step 1: Wavelet packet decomposition.
 step 2: Best basis selection.
Since the mark is set on the best basis, the basis should
be both robust to attacks and contain enough vectors so
that sufficiently rich marks may be implemented. For
instance, we do not wish to select only packets at the
highest or lowest resolution levels because they would
not fulfill these constraints. The following criterion for
best basis selection helps to attain our objectives. In
short, we shall elect a packet to be in the basis B if it
has sufficient energy and if its offsprings do not share
this property. Formally: C
p;i;j
2 B iff C
p;i;j
2 F

and C
p+1;2i;2j
62 F

, where the set F

is defined in a
recursive way:
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where x[2] means x modulo 2. The best basis is thus of
maximal depth and contains only packets which have
“sufficient” energy: a packet is in the best basis if it
belongs to F

but its offsprings do not. F

is the set of
packets which have energy larger than  and such that
their brothers, father and uncles also have energy larger
than . The important question of the optimal choice
of the threshold  is addressed in the next section.
 step 3: Extraction of the sub-bases.
Let B be the set of all admissible bases corresponding
to the image. We define an operator E :
B 7 ! P(B)
B 7 ! SB = B
1
; B
2
; :::; B
m
where B
1
; B
2
; :::; B
m
are disjoint subsets of B on
which the mark will be implemented. SB is the secret
key associated to the process and we have : SB  B.
Note that, of course, the extraction operator E should
not easily be invertible.
To each sub-base B
i
, we then associate a scalar e
i
: e
i
is 0 if the number of elements in B
i
is even and is 1
otherwise (see figure 4).
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Figure 4. Encoding of the mark on a sub-base.
 step 4: Encoding of the mark.
We first modify SB according to the watermark that
identifies the owner of the image. This is modeled by
an operator :
P(B)W 7 ! P(B)
(SB;W ) 7 ! SB

= B

1
; B

2
; :::; B

m
where the set of watermarks W is simply f0; 1gm.
SB
 is computed in the following way:
1. if w
i
= e
i
, then the elements of SB at are equal
to those of SB
2. otherwise, we suppress the element of SB that
has highest energy and add at scale below its four
offsprings to fill B. SB is filled by the offsprings
selected by E.
3. the same procedure is performed iteratively for
all the subset.
Once SB is completely defined, we modify the im-
age to get the corresponding best basis B. To this
end, the coefficients of the offsprings of the elements
suppressed from SB are increased in absolute value so
that the energy in their packet becomes larger than .
This procedure is iterated for each subset starting from
the lowest resolution (see figure 4). Finally, to make
the process more resistant to attacks, we slightly mod-
ify the whole image in the following way : we multiply
those coefficients which are “close” to the thresthold
by a value that move them away from the thresthold.
Finally, the decoding process simply follows the same steps
1,2,3 as above, and then replaces step 4 by the computa-
tion of the parity of the number of vectors at each level of
the m secret sub-bases. The presence of the mark is then
classicaly assessed through computation of the Hamming
distance between the observed parity vector and the theo-
retical one. Note that the decoding process does not require
the knowledge of the original image.
4 Fine tuning of the parameters
Our method requires that a number of choices be made
regarding the various parameters. In general, it is a delicate
matter to derive values which are universally optimal. This
would imply the knowledge of all possible images and all
possible attacks, which is clearly impossible. A way out
is to restrict the considered range of images and/or attacks.
For some applications, for instance photographic reproduc-
tion of artworks, it is quite natural to focus on a given type
of images. In this paper, we will rather specify a set of pos-
sible attacks and keep all freedom on the kind of marked
images.
We have chosen to use as a model for the set of all pos-
sible attacks the Stirmark software, which has served as a
benchmark for testing the robustness of watermarks by var-
ious authors [5]. Our aim in this section is thus to try and
set some of the parameters of our method so as to maxi-
mize its resistance to the attacks implemented in Stirmark.
More precisely, we will consider the choice of the energy
threshold in the best basis selection. To simplify notation,
we denote from now on c
i
the energy of the packet at “loca-
tion” i, where i an index that subsumes the information of
scale and frequency. Obvious requirements concerning the
energy threshold  are the following : on the one hand, 
should be set small enough so that sufficiently many pack-
ets have energy larger than , and that a best basis may be
found. On the other hand, a large  is desirable, because
selection of low energy packets should be forbidden (they
are not robust to attacks such as compression or filtering).
If we consider specifically the problem of robustness to at-
tacks, something more precise may be said. Let I be the
set of the indices of all wavelet packets coefficients, J be
the subset of all indices in the marked image such that the
corresponding coefficients are eligible to be in the best ba-
sis, i.e. i 2 J if c
i
> , and K be the complement of
J in I . Since the secret key is chosen independently of the
best basis, an ideal choice for  (as far as robustness is con-
cerned) would be one that makes both the sets J and K
stable under the action of any attack. In other words, an
ideal situation would be one where c
i
>  ) d
i
>  and
c
i
<  ) d
i
< , where c
i
denotes the energy of a packet
in the marked image and d
i
the corresponding energy in the
image after an attack. Indeed, such a choice would insure
that the same coefficients are considered whether the image
has been attacked or not, yielding in turn the same parity at
each level, and making the mark insensitive to attacks.
While it is not possible to find such a  in general, we
may try to be as close as possible to this ideal case. In this
view, a reasonable approach is to use an asymmetric proce-
dure and to look for two reals (; 0) so that the number of
coefficients for which c
i
  and d
i
 
0 have opposite signs
is minimum in some sense. Denoting e and e the maximum
and minimum of the energy of all packets, we consider the
following stochastic modeling of our problem.
For a fixed image D, we consider the set C of all its
wavelet packets energy coefficients c
j
. The set 
 of ele-
mentary events is composed of “all identified attacks”, for
instance all attacks implemented in Stirmark. Our probabil-
ity triplet is thus (
;B;P), where B is the natural algebra
associated with 
 and P is the uniform probability. For
each index i 2 I , the wavelet packet energy coefficient d
i
is
a random variable whose probability distribution F
i
is de-
termined by the result of the action of all possible attacks
on the particular coefficient c
i
.
We consider the following random function :
S(; 
0
) =
X
i2I
(c
i
  )sgn(d
i
  
0
)
where sgn(x) = x
jxj
; sgn(0) = 0, and  is a C1 function
that approximates the sgn function, such as the arctangent
(this will simplify the optimization step). We seek to max-
imize B(; 0) = E(S(; 0)) w.r.t. (; 0) 2  = [e; e],
where E denotes expectation and the bounds set on (, 0),
are a weak version of the requirements described at the be-
ginning of this subsection, namely that enough coefficients
should be eligible, but packets with too low energy should
not be included. Such restrictions also allow our problem
to be well posed, otherwise (, 0) = (0; 0) and (, 0) =
(1;1) would be degenerate solutions independent of the
input image. It is easy to check that:
B(; 
0
) =
X
i2I
(c
i
  )(1  2F
i
(
0
)) (1)
If the F
i
are C2, so is B(; 0)1, and its maximum may be
found by classical gradient descent once the F
i
are known.
To learn the F
i
-s, we adopted the following strategy: for
each image in a learning set, we computed for each c
i
the empirical distribution corresponding to all attacks. We
checked that, for a given position i, the empirical distribu-
tions F I
i
were roughly similar for all images I. We then
approximated the common F
i
using a shifted Gamma dis-
tribution with density of the form:
f
i
(x) = (x  a  c
i
)
b 1
e
 c(x a c
i
)
H(x  a  c
i
)
where  = c
b
 (b)
and H is the Heaviside function. a; b; c
are free parameters to be estimated from empirical distribu-
tion. The choice of the Gamma distribution and the form
of the shift were made on the basis of the observed empir-
ical distributions and on “semi-heuristic”considerations. In
particular, if we assume that one can model the action of at-
tacks as the addition of Gaussian white noise to the wavelet
coefficients, then the energies should be distributed as a chi-
square, which is a particular case of Gamma distribution. In
addition, the fact Gamma distributions are stable by linear
combinations is also useful for our purpose. Figure 5 shows
examples of empirical distributions of the wavelet packets
energy which have been submitted to the 89 attacks imple-
mented in Stirmak. Figure 6 shows a fitted Gamma distribu-
tion using a maximum likelihood estimate of a; b; c. Once
the parameters and thus the F
i
are known, it is an easy task
to compute (; 0) that maximize B(; 0).
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Figure 5. Empirical distributions of the attacked wavelet
packet energies, for packet C
8;203;201
in the Lena (left) and
Barbara (right) images.
While the above modeling works fine for attacks such
as compression or small angle rotations, other ones based
on cropping or low-pass filtering are not well controlled by
this approach. These attacks can however be taken care of
efficiently through adequate restrictions on the secret key.
This will be presented elsewhere.
1While there are a finite number of attacks in Stirmark, we may still
assume that F
i
has a density by considering that the various parameters
(e.g. the compression rate in JPEG) can be tuned in a continuous way.
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Figure 6. Empirical distributions of the attacked wavelet
packet energies and the fitted version.
5 Numerical Experiments
We show an experiment on a boat image of size 256256
pixels coded on 8 bits. Figure 7 shows the original signal
along with a marked image containing a 32 bits watermark
with redundancy equal to 71 . The PSNR between the two
images is 49,27 dB. Figure 8 shows the watermark detector
response to 1000 randomly generated watermarks after an
attack consisting of JPEG compression with 30 % quality.
This and other experiments made on several images with
various attacks show that our method is an efficient and ro-
bust watermarking technique.
Figure 7. Original (left) and watermarked image (right).
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Figure 8. Watermark detector response to 1000 randomly
generated watermarks after JPEG compression.
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